Holding their ground

THE roar of artillery goes on and on: every few minutes cannons fire illumination rounds into the air, lighting up the night sky beyond the checkpoints of the fledgling Afghan army. Only a few kilometres from the main highway, it is still Taliban territory.

Ghazni is a crucial province, south-west of Kabul, that carries the highway from the capital to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second city. Ghazni is mired in the insurgency. Here, as almost everywhere in Afghanistan, NATO forces have largely stopped fighting the Taliban, having handed over security to the Afghan army and police. How the Afghan forces perform without America and its allies will largely determine the future of the country once international combat forces withdraw in 2014.

Much still seems grim in Ghazni, years after NATO sensed that the war was being lost and sent extra troops to Afghanistan. A “secure zone” extends at most a few kilometres from the Kabul-Kandahar highway. The insurgents seem often to act with impunity, hitting convoys on the highway two or three times a day and even maintaining checkpoints on it in broad daylight. They have unimpeded access to sanctuaries and supplies in Pakistan. NATO bases come under frequent, if mostly ineffective, fire. In many areas the Taliban rule openly. The government’s writ is patchy outside the provincial capital.

Since NATO ceased combat operations early this year, violence in Ghazni has fallen. “Many people see us as occupiers, and now it’s harder for the Taliban to say they’re fighting infidels,” says Colonel Stephen Michael, the American commander. On the other hand, casualties among Afghan security forces are up by half compared with a year earlier, reflecting their increased role. They still receive some coalition help, including artillery support, but most of the assistance comes in the form of advice.

The Americans insist that the Afghans are ready, pointing out the lead locals have taken for half a year. It has helped that Afghans have received much-needed heavy weaponry and better vehicles. But they struggle to supply fuel and ammunition, maintain equipment, provide air support, evacuate the injured, and detect and deal with improvised explosive devices. Co-ordination among various arms and services is in its infancy. Afghan security forces are also hobbled by ethnic tensions. The local police will not employ Hazaras, although they make up nearly half the province’s population. Elite police units have no Pushtuns, the majority group (and the ethnic base of the Taliban).

It would be a mistake to write off the Afghan security forces. They are keen to fight, and if they have little time for training, it is because they are always out on operations. In the past few months, they have actually widened Ghazni’s secure zone. They are undermanned, however. As a result they rely increasingly on local police units to man checkpoints and gather intelligence. Some of these fighters are former insurgents who have switched sides. Some are commanded by petty warlords with as little love for the government as for the insurgents. The so-called Muqur movement, in the south-west of the province, is at its core a thuggish group, involved in the opium trade, who happen to share an enemy with the government. But many in Ghazni just want a better life. Last year an uprising in Andar, in the east of the province, dislodged insurgents from villages after leaders got fed up with the Taliban closing schools and killing people.

The insurgents are hardly strong—probably no more than a few hundred fighters altogether in Ghazni province—and more a nuisance than a mortal threat to the central government—mostly attacking checkpoints and rarely inflicting serious damage. They appear to have little genuine support among the population. And if anything, NATO’s withdrawal next year seems likely to sharpen the Afghan security forces’ game.

Provided, then, that the West keeps paying for Afghanistan’s army, the government’s survival is not really at stake. Still, the insurgents are resilient, and they are unlikely to disappear. It may never be possible to end the insurgency without a political deal.