Russia’s self-isolation

EPA

DOES Russia have a future in Europe? A country of Russia's sheer size, beset with problems on such a scale, from its rusting nuclear warheads to its fissile politics, its fractious republics and its fragmenting economy, can never be safely overlooked. But in the Europe now being shaped Russia ought to count for more than just its nuisance value. For all its difficulties, other Europeans like to see Russia as a democracy-of-sorts in the making, as a potential free-market trading partner for the European Union and as a collaborator in all sorts of worthy security schemes, from the 54-nation Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to the NATO-Russia Founding Act. But the brutal war in Chechnya has brought Russia and the rest of Europe to a crossroads, with Russia headed for dangerous isolation.

Some friction with post-communist Russia was inevitable, if only because of Russian resentment of America's new geopolitical pre-eminence. And it has duly arisen—over arms control, Iraq, NATO's expansion and Kosovo. Even as Russia's relations with America have deteriorated, however, the bigger European powers have worked to prevent a new East-West divide from opening up in Europe. Russia has often tried to take advantage of their concern, by playing them off against America. It is a game all sides have understood. But Russia seems not to have noticed how Europe's rules are changing.

While Russia appears content to measure its GDP in fired prime ministers and its worth in the wider world by the number of spanners it can toss in various western works, most of the rest of Europe has been, literally, pulling itself together. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have joined NATO and hope to be among the first easterners to join the EU. New NATO invitation cards will not be given out easily, since the war in Kosovo showed that defence is a serious business. But the list of EU applicants lengthens by the week. Even Bulgaria and Slovakia, once sceptical of free politics and the market, are keen to line up. Of the countries that Russia had hoped one way or another to hold close, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are all busily strengthening their westward links. Not all these countries are yet models of democracy and the rule of law. But the fact that they are trying to improve makes Russia's self-isolation all the more damaging.

Because of its size and its different interests in the world, Russia is not a likely candidate for either NATO or the EU, but both are keen for closer relations. Meanwhile, Russia has, through the OSCE and the Council of Europe (see article), committed itself to common principles on such matters as human rights—which is why other Europeans find its duffing up of Chechnya so dismaying. The Chechen rebels are no saints, but for the second time in four years Russia has undertaken an indiscriminate assault on civilians that breaks every rule it has accepted, including some that Boris Yeltsin put his name to only last week at the OSCE summit in Istanbul.

The current fighting in Chechnya will end sooner or later. If Russia is able to restore stability there without much more loss of life, and then has the wisdom to negotiate a deal on far-reaching autonomy, the damage to its standing in Europe could in time be mended. But if Russia's generals insist on flattening the Chechen capital, Grozny, to avenge their humiliation there four years ago, and thus create new streams of refugees, Russia will only damage itself further.

Unfortunately, with Russia in belligerent mood and an election due next month for parliament (and next year for the presidency), few Russian politicians have the courage to criticise the Chechen campaign. And just about every other issue on the table for discussion with either Europe or America—from arms control and oil pipelines to human rights, economic assistance and democracy-building—is seen the same way in Russia: if others seem to gain, then we must be losing, and vice versa. But it need not be that way.

No zero-sum games

A stable Caucasus, open to trade with both East and West, would benefit Russia too. Whether new oil and gas pipelines are built through Russia or its neighbours, Russian firms can profit. Finding ways to prevent limited missile defences in the West (partly driven by Russia's missile help to Iran and others) from setting off a new arms race is as much in Russia's interest as in America's. Cleaning up its hit-man economy, thereby increasing foreign investment, foreign trade and Russian prosperity, would do more to bolster Russia's influence than any number of fist-banging sessions with foreign leaders.

Russia is not yet a lost cause. Its well-wishers will patiently keep a seat warm for it at the top table of democracies. But they also need to go on telling Russia just how far it falls below the standards of behaviour that modern Europeans are supposed to share. And Russia would be wise to listen.