The Tory insurgency

IT WAS expected to be a desperately close-run thing: a race to the bottom between the Conservatives and the Labour Party, long since deadlocked in the polls, which would leave both parties far short of a majority. The consequences for Britain’s hoary political system, if unable to bring about the stable government the country craves, were predicted to be grave; and they may yet be. But as The Economist went to press in the early hours of May 8th, it seemed that David Cameron’s party had won an extraordinary vindication for a rather lifeless campaign and the stolid economic record it was based upon. The Conservatives looked certain to be easily the biggest party in the next parliament. With a fair wind, they might even creep across the threshold of 323 seats, which would give them an absolute working majority.

Even if Mr Cameron falls short, he may attempt a minority government; many of his MPs, who over the past five years have developed a pigheaded antipathy to their junior coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, would prefer that. The moderate Mr Cameron, who secretly agrees with Nick Clegg, the Lib Dems’ leader, on a great deal, might well prefer another coalition. Yet in any event, the electoral massacre suffered by Mr Clegg’s party, which lost well over half its 57 seats and may yet trigger its leader’s resignation, makes that less important. To shore up his numbers, the Tory leader could alternatively make a less formal deal with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), whose eight seats are available to him.