Reports of another high-level execution would be appalling—if ascertained
|SEOUL
WHEN in 2012 Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, delivered his first public speech, he made strengthening the military his “first, second and third” priorities. It was all of a piece with the concerns of a country that clings desperately to its nuclear-weapons programme. But Mr Kim has made his generals a focus of his rule in another way: by promoting and purging them with unusual frequency.
Since taking power in December 2011, Mr Kim has set in motion more churn within senior ranks of the army than at any other time in the country’s history, says Michael Madden, a North Korea watcher who studies such things. Other parts of the state have been in flux too, including the Workers' Party; according to South Korea’s spy agency, Mr Kim has removed 72 high-ranking officials since coming to power. To the surprise of many, he executed Jang Sung Taek, vice-chairman of the powerful National Defence Commission and uncle to Mr Kim, on charges of treason in December 2013.
So the news, on May 13th, that the supreme leader had executed his defence minister, Hyon Yong Chol, would fit a pattern of purges—though it would make it Mr Kim’s next-biggest political liquidation after Uncle Jang. Like Mr Jang, Mr Hyon was allegedly accused of treason. The purge also feeds into the view that the centre of power in the regime has shifted from the army to the party since Mr Kim took charge; purges in the military have been “remarkably more severe” recently, says Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul. The South’s spies said Mr Hyon was executed by anti-aircraft machine gun at a firing range on April 30th, with hundreds in attendance.
Comparing the Koreas
There are some reasons to believe them. They correctly reported Jang’s purge shortly before North Korea (very unusually) announced his arrest and reported his trial. This time around Mr Hyon could easily be wheeled out to prove them wrong; he attended a music concert only the day before his alleged execution. And the intelligence service has a reputation to salvage: it has been marred by political scandal at home and disinformation campaigns on the North, often leaked to local news outlets, some of them recycled over the years.
Indeed, ghoulish news from the rogue state tends to delight. That Mr Hyon was gunned down because he dozed off during a meeting, as the agency alleges, seems far-fetched (though Jang was accused in his trial of “half-hearted clapping”). Widely read reports that Jang was torn apart by a pack of ravenous dogs originated as the musings of a satirist based in China. In August 2013 a South Korean news outlet reprinted Chinese whispers that Mr Kim had executed by firing squad his ex-lover and members of her orchestra for selling sex tapes. She appeared on North Korean state television last August.
The mode of Mr Hyon’s alleged death is not unheard of. The Institute for National Security Strategy, a think-tank run by the intelligence services, said in a report last year that Mr Kim purged 20 officials close to Jang, executing some by firing squad. Last month the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, a Washington-based activist group, published satellite imagery of “unusual activity” on a firing range at a military training facility last October. It observed trucks, a battery of six anti-aircraft guns and targets within a 30m range; its most “plausible explanation” was a “gruesome public execution”.
Watchers say it is odd that Mr Hyon would appear in state media around the time of his reported death, as the North typically removes references to those who fall out of favour. Confusing accounts are already emerging: the spy agency now says it has not been able to verify that he has been executed, only that he has been purged. Still, his rise and fall within the army’s uppermost ranks exemplifies a new style of management for Mr Kim: under him, Mr Hyon has been one of four defence ministers and four chiefs of the general staff, two key positions at the head of the army. Mr Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, had three defence ministers during his 17-year rule. Mr Hyon has also been promoted and demoted within his position, from a four-star general to vice-marshal, and down to a three-star general.
As defence minister, he would have been involved in the North’s arms industry, logistics and lucrative foreign-trading corporations, says Mr Madden. One of the reasons for his suspected purge might not be altogether different to what ensnared Jang: a fight for control over resources. Successive purges suggest paranoia—without necessarily meaning Mr Kim’s position is unstable: like Stalin’s mass purges of 1937, Mr Kim is removing all potential rivals, says Mr Lankov. For now, random and sometimes brutal eliminations allow the young leader to demonstrate the power that he is consolidating.
