Gloves off

FOR months Japan’s Diet (parliament) has been debating one of the country’s most important legislative changes since the second world war. Shinzo Abe, the prime minister, wants to make it easier for Japan’s armed forces to join military activities abroad and defend allies under attack—principally America. But Mr Abe’s long-cherished aim of loosening the shackles of the country’s pacifist constitution is proving unpopular at home.

The government wants to ram a clutch of security bills through the Diet’s lower house by July 16th. Despite complaints about this by some of Japan’s neighbours who are still haunted by memories of its role in the war, the laws would not involve sweeping change. Japan would still not send combat troops abroad, even on peacekeeping missions. It would be able to use military force to protect its allies, but only if Japan itself were deemed to be in a “survival-threatening situation”. Worryingly for Mr Abe, however, public support is receding ever farther.

A recent poll by the state broadcaster, NHK, found that almost half the population did not understand the bills. Even Sankei Shimbun, a strongly pro-government newspaper, says that nearly 60% oppose passing them this summer. Public backing for the government has dipped below 40% for the first time since Mr Abe called—and won—a snap election last year, according to the Asahi Shimbun, a liberal newspaper. Mr Abe’s difficulties were highlighted last month when three legal experts testified before the Diet that the government’s plans violated the constitution, article nine of which says that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” One expert, Yasuo Hasebe, had been asked to testify by the prime minister’s own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Mr Abe says he does not want Japan to become embroiled in foreign conflicts. But he does value the alliance with America, which wants him to find ways of enabling his country to play a bigger security role. Both Japan and America worry about the rise of China and North Korean military madness. Neither government wants Japan to be hogtied by old rules should an emergency arise, such as an attack by China on an American ship defending Japan. One aim is to achieve “inter-operability” with American forces, in line with new guidelines for the two countries’ military relationship that were adopted during a visit by Mr Abe to Washington in April.

During that trip Mr Abe had no problem convincing his hosts of the need for new security laws in Japan. But he angered lawmakers at home when he told America’s Congress that his legislation would be passed by both houses of the Diet this summer. At that stage, the bills had still not even been submitted. His pledge looks increasingly rash; the lower house may be close to passing the bills, but there will still be haggling in the upper house where the LDP lacks a majority.

Much of the debate relates to the constitution, especially article nine, which is treasured by many Japanese. But those who accuse Mr Abe of violating it ignore the fact that it has long been interpreted loosely. The document, for example, permits no army, navy or air force; but Japan has had all three since the 1950s. (It got around the ban by calling them “self-defence forces”.) It was Mr Abe’s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan, who raised the idea of allowing Japan to engage in “collective” security, as defending allies from attack is described.

You say army, I say self-defence force

Mr Abe is eager to make Japan a more normal military power, but he has failed to convince many citizens that this is necessary. The government has found only a handful of leading scholars to support its view publicly. Critics, meanwhile, have been having a field day: an academic group campaigning against the laws has gathered support from 9,000 scholars, including some who normally support Mr Abe. This has led to recriminations. Mr Hasebe, the constitutional scholar, has been bitterly attacked by LDP members who once respected him. At a meeting in June at the LDP’s headquarters, several lawmakers blamed the media for failing to help the public to understand the bills. They proposed leaning on advertisers to smother negative coverage of them. (Mr Abe distanced himself from their comments.)

One reason why Mr Abe has been having trouble selling the legislation is that he is reluctant to describe specific scenarios that might require “collective defence”. China would be enraged if he were even to hint that its behaviour might be a cause for Japanese concern. Mr Abe has given only one possible example: joining allies to end a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, through which flows much of the oil on which Japan depends.

Asked about his struggle over the legislation, Mr Abe told The Economist that it took 25-30 years for the majority of Japanese to accept the need for a security treaty with America (pushed through in 1960 by his grandfather, the then prime minister, Nobusuke Kishi)—implying that the public would eventually support the latest bills too. But it will burn up political capital that Mr Abe badly needs to push ahead with long-delayed economic reforms. He has been talking to right-leaning opposition parties in an effort to garner support in the upper house. Even if the bills are rejected there, they could become law by September if the government can muster a two-thirds majority in the lower house. That should be possible if the LDP can get Komeito, its coalition partner, to co-operate. An extra-long Diet session may help: on June 22nd, with boycotts and protests bogging down parliamentary debate, the government decided to keep the legislature open through the summer.

Mr Abe may take heart from China’s relatively muted response so far. Though state media in China have issued their usual warnings about a revival of Japanese “militarism”, its government has moved in recent months to restore stability to an often turbulent relationship with Japan. After long shunning high-level contacts with Mr Abe’s administration, the Chinese government is now more willing to talk to it—even about ways of ensuring that the two countries do not come to blows.