Asia | Islamic State in Afghanistan

Raising the black flag?

|HERAT

By The Economist

FOR months the presence of Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan was the subject of rumours and little more. Small splinter groups of local militants hoisted black flags, but they showed no sign of operational connections to the self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Their talk sounded like fanciful bluster.

That changed on April 18th when a motorcyclist wearing a vest rigged with explosives blew himself to pieces in a crowd of bank customers in Jalalabad. He killed at least 35 other people and injured more than 120. Within the hour a group that says it represents IS in Afghanistan and Pakistan claimed responsibility for the attack. They call themselves Wilayat Khorasan, referring to the entire region as if they were a provincial government within a caliphate. Afghanistan’s president, Ashraf Ghani, was swift to blame IS for the bombing.

The attack amplified questions that Afghans had already been asking: Is Islamic State gaining an actual foothold in Afghanistan? Are the alleged IS fighters merely disgruntled or excommunicated Taliban, vying for fresh attention? Is it all a hoax? Officials cannot seem to agree. If this attack were the work of IS agents, it would count as their first known operation outside the Arab world (though attackers have carried out operations in IS's name farther afield). In Afghanistan, with a crumbling security situation and a new government seemingly unable to do anything about it, the threat of IS has become a political lightning rod.

Ismail Khan, an ageing warlord and prominent veteran from the war against the Soviets in the 1970s and 1980s, urges his countrymen to take the threat seriously. “This is just the beginning of [Islamic State’s] operations,” Mr Khan said in an interview in his lavish mansion in Herat, the western city he ran for years as a personal fief. Mr Khan rejects the notion that the Arab leadership of Islamic State would be regarded as foreign elements in Afghanistan, and so prevent their movement from taking root here. The Taliban and IS are certain to merge into a formidable force, he believes. Mr Khan, however, has found himself struggling to remain relevant since Mr Ghani's government took power. Mr Ghani has purposely sidelined Mr Khan and his generation of mujahideen strongmen, who insist they are the country’s only bulwark against the advance of IS.

That IS poses a real danger to Afghanistan is about the only thing Mr Khan and Mr Ghani agree on. In a recent speech to America’s Congress, Mr Ghani called IS a “terrible threat”. IS or not, his security forces have been dying in record numbers since the American-led “drawdown” of foreign troops. He well knows that fear of Islamic State is one of the only things capable of getting American sabres rattling and funds flowing. But Amrullah Saleh, an internationally respected former spy chief for Afghanistan, says the threat has been overblown. He thinks the Taliban, perhaps in co-operation with Pakistan’s intelligence service, were behind the attack. Moreover, in his view, they are playing a “trick” on other Afghans, posing as IS in order to distance themselves from the blame.

In any case IS will face an uphill battle in Afghanistan, ideologically speaking. For one, the Taliban adhere to a Deobandi school of Sunni Islam, while IS espouse a stricter, Salafi interpretation of the faith. Whereas IS have ambitions of a transcontinental caliphate, Taliban have a Pushtun-nationalist outlook. And while the Taliban occasionally target ethnic Hazaras, they do not seek the type of genocidal purge of Shias that IS has undertaken. Indeed, the police chief of Helmand province said this week that he has evidence of IS activity in his districts—where they have taken up arms against the Taliban.

The emergence of IS-loyalist groups would underscore the fact that Afghanistan’s militant opposition is divided, and increasingly so. Some younger fighters are clamouring for signs of life from Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s paramount leader who has been in hiding since 2001. Fissures within their organisation may open up fertile ground for more extremist factions. Rival factions can also complicate the future of any peace negotiations. Extremism within the insurgency makes it harder for the Taliban to make concessions to the government. On the other hand, the risk of further fragmentation could make it more pressing for the Taliban to gather consensus behind peace talks as soon as possible. The Taliban can still mobilise tens of thousands of fighters, who are killing Afghan soldiers and police in record numbers. The government is well aware of this; whatever they say, IS should not be among its most urgent concerns.

Discover more

What next for Pakistan?

The new government faces polarised politics, a faltering economy and terrorist threats

The Islamic State’s branch in Afghanistan is at war with the world

The group which claimed responsibility for the Crocus City Hall attack is increasingly worrying


Arvind Kejriwal’s imprisonment is a stain on India’s democracy

He is the first sitting chief minister in the country’s history to be arrested