A disputed sea is a growing security nightmare—and increasingly an ecological one
AMERICA and its friends in Asia have long worried about the South China Sea becoming a Chinese lake—a vast stretch of water, through which half the world’s commercial shipping passes, falling under the control of China’s fast-expanding navy and coastguard. In the past few months these fears have been amplified by satellite pictures showing Chinese barges pouring sand onto disputed reefs, in order to turn them into islands. On several of these remote outcrops, unsuited to civilian habitation, China appears to be building airstrips and harbours to accommodate jets and warships.
With this show of military force, China is asserting a long-standing, if outrageous, claim to ownership of virtually the entire sea. This is a dramatic change of tack (see article). China still claims to believe in settling territorial disputes by diplomacy. Yet, by going ahead and planting its flags, it is ignoring the protests of its neighbours, not to mention America.
This change is even more unsettling, given that for years China has been trying to win friends in South-East Asia. The ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is usually reluctant to criticise the giant next door. Yet on April 28th its leaders ended an annual summit in Malaysia with an unusually blunt statement: reclamation work on the reefs, they said, had “eroded trust and confidence” in the South China Sea and threatened to “undermine peace, security and stability”. And in Washington, standing next to Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, President Barack Obama said that “real tensions” had arisen in the South China Sea and that China’s muscle-flexing was “the wrong way” to go about things.
There has always been a risk that rivalries in the South China Sea could flare into military conflict. In 2002 China and ASEAN agreed that disputants should resolve differences peacefully, “exercise self-restraint” and adopt a formal code of conduct for their activities. But China has shown no eagerness to develop such a code. The Philippines, fed up with its obduracy, has challenged the basis of its territorial claims before a UN-backed tribunal. China has refused to co-operate. All sides are now digging in their heels.
ASEAN is right to speak with a united voice (at last). If it sticks together, it stands a better chance of persuading China to embrace a code of conduct. But ASEAN is weak and will become weaker if its largest member, Indonesia, fails to play a leading role—as may happen under the country’s new president, Joko Widodo (see article). Although China has signed up to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which sets the rules for territorial claims, America has yet to ratify it. That makes the convention’s principles easier to ignore.
Greening the way to peace
Security is not the only concern in the South China Sea. The environment is also under threat. Like the Mediterranean, the sea is shallow and largely enclosed. An ecological catastrophe is taking place, as reclamation destroys reefs, agricultural and industrial run-off poisons the water and overfishing depletes fish stocks. The littoral states ought to be working together to manage the sea, but the dispute over sovereignty fosters the fear that any collaboration will be taken as a concession.
If they are to save the sea, the regional states must urgently put aside their differences. Indeed, if they could only co-operate over the environment, they might just find the territorial disputes easier to settle, too.
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Sea of troubles"
