Tug of war

IT IS ironic that Brexiteers who yearn for British independence from the European Union are often fervently against any nation’s independence from the United Kingdom. Yet Brexit would have big repercussions for Scotland and Northern Ireland, and to some extent Wales. In all three the debate has been more subdued than in England, perhaps because majorities of voters look likely to back the Remain side (unlike the 1975 referendum, when they were all less keen than England on Europe). But this means that Brexit, were it to happen, would be imposed by English voters against the wishes of many along the Celtic fringe.

It would certainly rile the Scots, who see Brussels as a sort of alternative power centre to London. A recent debate in the Scottish parliament found all five main parties there backing Remain. Opinion polls suggest that as many as 75% of Scottish voters might agree. Remainers have tried to use the Scottish card to strengthen their hand in England by warning that Brexit would trigger a second independence referendum which (despite losing the first one in 2014 by 55-45%) a resurgent Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) might win.

Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP leader and first minister of Scotland, has declared Brexit would be a “material change” that could lead to unstoppable demands for another referendum. Yet there are reasons to doubt it would happen soon. The SNP remains dominant in Scotland, after sweeping 56 of the 59 Scottish seats at Westminster in the 2015 general election. But a month ago it lost its overall majority in the Scottish parliament, when the Conservatives leapt into second place. And even if she were able to call a second referendum, Ms Sturgeon cannot risk it unless she is certain of winning. The example of Quebec suggests that two lost votes can sink hopes of independence for decades.

Moreover, the uncertainties that defeated independence in 2014 remain. Oil prices are half as high as then, so an independent Scotland would face even bigger economic and fiscal difficulties. After Brexit, the EU might be more welcoming to a Scotland seeking membership, but it would still object to its keeping the pound instead of adopting the euro. And if a post-Brexit United Kingdom ended free movement of people from the EU, that might mean erecting a border between north and south. England is by far Scotland’s largest trading partner. Any border (or customs) controls along Hadrian’s Wall could be very damaging. Such considerations will surely lead Ms Sturgeon to think hard before pressing for a second independence referendum. She certainly will not move fast.

In contrast, Brexit would create immediate headaches for Northern Ireland, starting with the economy. Farming matters more in Northern Ireland than on the mainland, and it depends more on EU subsidies. Links to Ireland are crucial: it takes 34% of Northern Irish exports. Brussels has provided massive support to Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Many in Belfast are sceptical of Leavers’ promises to make up for any money lost by Brexit. Claire Hanna, a member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party in the assembly, points out that, unlike Britain overall, Northern Ireland is a substantial net beneficiary from the EU budget.

Ireland is the EU country most worried about Brexit. Irish ministers regularly state their opposition. Relations between the two nations are better than at any time in their history, and economic links have become closer. Travel and trade across the border are easier than ever. Britain is Ireland’s biggest export market, and Britain exports more to Ireland than to China, India and Brazil combined. Dublin to London is the world’s second-busiest international air route (after Hong Kong to Taipei).

Don’t shake it all about

Leavers say there is no reason why any of this should be affected by Brexit. Trade would continue. The common travel area between north and south began in 1922, not 1973. The Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Irish peace process did not rely on the EU. Most Northern Irish voters, especially nationalists who want a united Ireland, back Remain, though Arlene Foster, leader of the Democratic Unionists and first minister, supports Leave as, more vocally, does the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers.

Yet many in Belfast and Dublin find this attitude irresponsible. The common travel area worked only when both countries were either out of or in the European project, not when one was in and the other out. If a post-Brexit Britain restricted free movement or left the EU’s single market, there would be consequences for its only land border with another EU country, the 300-mile (480km) line dividing Northern Ireland from Ireland. Britain and Ireland might still not want to restore a hard border with customs and passport checks, but, as Cathy Gormley-Heenan of the University of Ulster points out, the other 26 EU countries would also have a say, because it would be their border, too.

Nationalists in the north have already said that, post-Brexit, they would demand a referendum to redraw the border with the south. Memories of a hard border are unhappy. Even the British army found smuggling hard to stop; post-Brexit, that might include people-trafficking. Any suggestion of imposing passport controls on travellers from Northern Ireland to mainland Britain in order to prevent a back door for Europeans into the UK would be anathema to unionists in the north. But the biggest concern over Brexit concerns the peace process itself.

Edward Burke at the University of Portsmouth says it is wrong to claim the EU played no role in peace in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 relied heavily on Britain and Ireland both being members and signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights (which some Brexiteers want to leave). But even more important was the psychological factor. As Ms Gormley-Heenan puts it, the EU gave cover to both nationalists and unionists to accept a compromise that fell short of unification but gave Ireland, via Brussels, a disguised say in the province. Would a post-Brexit Britain concede a bigger role to Dublin instead?

That does not mean Brexit would bring a return to the troubled years of violence. Yet the situation in the province remains tense, as west Belfast’s intimidating “peace walls” between such places as the (Protestant) Shankill and (Catholic) Ardoyne estates show. Brexit could trigger a backlash from nationalists who, as in Scotland, have become strong supporters of the EU as a counterweight to London.

Destabilising Northern Ireland would be a high price to pay for Brexit. But even if Remain won, doubts over the union’s future would persist. A new House of Lords report into the union argues that today’s constitutional settlement is unstable, and criticises the government for having no strategy for the future. The ultimate irony, says John Curtice of Strathclyde University, would be if, in an extremely tight vote, Britain ended up remaining in the EU only because nationalists in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales outvoted the English. That would surely rekindle English nationalism in virulent form, creating the biggest threat of all to the United Kingdom.