Moves to restore full Israeli-Turkish ties have lost steam

THE initial feedback from Ankara after a high-level meeting between Israeli and Turkish officials, held in London on April 7th, spoke excitedly of an imminent agreement on the restoration of full diplomatic ties between the two countries. Israeli sources, however, were more sceptical, insisting that the two main obstacles remained. Israel is demanding that Turkey close down its local office of the Palestinian militant movement Hamas, which it claims is directing terror attacks in the West Bank and within Israel. The Israeli government also refuses the Turkish demand that as part of the resumption of relations it eases the closure of the Gaza Strip and allows Turkey special access there. On April 11th Turkey changed its tone, with an official spokesman stating that unless Israel opens up Gaza a deal will not be reached. The rapprochment, it seems, is to be delayed.

Once strategic allies, ties between Israel and Turkey have frayed over the past decade as the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed patronage over the Palestinians in Gaza and protested over Israel’s periodic attacks and incursions there. In May 2010 an Israeli naval raid on a flotilla trying to break the blockade of Gaza resulted in the deaths of ten Turkish activists aboard. Previous rounds of talks focused on the issue of compensation for the deaths, but this has been resolved. Israeli officials now insist that while there is a broad consensus in both administrations in favour of restoring relations, the main stumbling block remains Mr Erdogan’s desire to continue portraying himself as Gaza’s protector.

A big factor in Israel’s staunch opposition to any special role for Turkey is the beleaguered coastal strip’s other neighbour, Egypt. At loggerheads with Ankara since the military coup in 2013 which overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government, President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi’s administration is adamant that it will not allow the Turks to gain a position of influence across its border with Gaza.

For decades, secular and non-Arab Turkey was a rare strategic and trade partner for Israel in the region. Turkey was the main holiday destination for Israelis and a customer of billions of dollars’ worth of Israeli arms. The two countries’ soldiers trained together, and through Turkey Israel gained a valuable intelligence-listening post on its enemies Iran and Syria. Under Mr Erdogan, the ties steadily deteriorated until he took the decision to drastically lower the level of diplomatic relations in 2010, effectively ending all strategic co-operation. Israel has since compensated by intensifying its security ties with Turkey’s rivals Greece and Cyprus, as well as Egypt, with which it co-operates in fighting Islamic State-affiliated terrorists in Sinai and, more quietly, with Saudi Arabia, with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations but shares a common cause in countering Iran’s regional ambitions. With a lot more friends in the region, it can afford to drive a harder bargain for a rapprochement.

Not that long ago, Mr Erdogan entertained ambitions of Turkey resuming its role from the Ottoman era as the Middle East’s and the Muslim world’s leading power. But as Sunni Arab regimes have shunned his party’s brand of Islamic politics, and the war in Syria has placed Turkey on the opposing side to Iran and Russia, its government has sought to rebuild the alliance with Israel. Gaza, though, remains the sticking point. Relinquishing his demand for special status there would be tantamount to Mr Erdogan admitting his designs of a sultanate had been dented.