Europe | Charlemagne

Special privileges

In shaping a deal to suit British interests, the EU may be storing up trouble for itself

IF BRITAIN adhered to Groucho Marx’s dictum of never joining a club willing to have him as a member, it would be on its way out of the European Union. The “renegotiation” of Britain’s EU membership pursued by David Cameron, the prime minister, has been a fanciful exercise designed to keep his Conservative Party in check. But it has at least forced Britain’s EU partners to accept that, if pushed, they are better off with the infuriating islanders as part of the family. The EU, said Bild, an exuberant German tabloid, would be “spiritually” poorer after a Brexit (even if that may be read as a plea not to be left with the French and Italians).

The paper was responding to a draft settlement for Britain sent to EU governments last week by Donald Tusk, president of the European Council. Mr Cameron aims to convert Mr Tusk’s paper into a deal during a summit of EU leaders on February 18th-19th, and then put Britain’s membership to a referendum, probably in June. There is plenty of time for hiccups before then. The Poles and others are grumbling about an “emergency brake” that allows Britain to restrict benefit payments to working EU immigrants. France is suspicious about safeguards for non-euro members. Last week Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, warned an audience in London that Britain had tested Europe’s patience. He and his fellow lawmakers could hold up the legislation needed to implement parts of the deal. Mr Tusk himself admits that the situation is “fragile”.

But broadly, although Mr Cameron has taken a hammering at home over the draft, the signs in Europe look good. Few seem in the mood for a showdown; even the Poles are less obstreperous than expected. Mr Cameron’s peers decided that they needed to give him enough goodies for him to make his case to voters. And the prime minister secured some victories that many had argued were beyond his reach, even if they hardly amount to the fundamental change in Britain’s membership that he once promised.

For that Mr Cameron can thank the litany of woes afflicting Europe. Next to security fears, euro-zone sclerosis and the worst migrant crisis the EU has ever known, Britain’s little problem looks eminently solvable—and the departure of an economic and foreign-policy heavyweight an accident best avoided. Mr Cameron helped by steadily restricting the scope of his demands (see article). And the dread prospect, should Britain vote to leave, of spending years in painful negotiations over an exit settlement probably did Mr Cameron no harm. When everything else is falling apart, says a European official, at least the Britain talks give us a chance to get something right.

Where does this leave the rest of Europe? Mr Tusk’s great fear was that other countries would seek their own special treatment during the renegotiation: a carve-out from climate rules for the Poles, say, or a more lenient fiscal regime for the periphery. So worried were the deal’s brokers that they explicitly warned some governments not to try any funny business during the talks.

And by and large, apart from Catalonia’s chancer of a president (who mused that he could exploit the flexibility the EU showed with Britain in his bid for independence from Spain), they did not. Indeed, the most contentious elements of the Tusk deal seem designed to avoid such antics. Much of the package consists of clarifications of existing law designed to soothe British anxieties without upsetting the workings of the EU (or tampering with its treaties). A “red card” granting groups of national parliaments the right to block legislation, for example, gives Mr Cameron something to boast about. But the threshold of 55% of parliaments means it will rarely, if ever, be used.

In graphics: A guide to “Brexit” from the European Union

Most strikingly, the legislation that will satisfy Mr Cameron’s obsessive demand to deny in-work benefits to migrants for four years will be crafted to limit its application beyond British shores. The European Commission, which will draft the law once the governments have struck their deal, has even stated that Britain satisfies the criteria for pulling the emergency brake before specifying what they are. Downing Street could not resist crowing about this concession before it was announced.

Then everyone will want one

Thus does the circle look squared. Mr Cameron will probably win a deal that he feels able to sell to British voters. Assuming there are no nasty accidents at referendum time, the rest of the EU reduces its list of crises by one without fatally damaging itself in the process. Could this turn out to be that rarest of beasts: a European diplomatic triumph?

Not quite. Mr Cameron says other countries can enjoy the fruits of his renegotiation, but few will. Apart from a rule allowing governments to pay lower child benefits to parents with children abroad (which migrant-worker magnets such as Germany may exploit), most EU countries do not care about the provisions Mr Cameron negotiated. This is a deal to satisfy British concerns.

Alas, that may be the problem. A package designed as an improvement for the whole machine might be presented as a one-off. But special treatment for the British sets a precedent. The Italians might cite it to pursue their vendetta against the fiscal limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact. Easterners could call for exemptions from refugee-sharing schemes. Previous special deals (such as the Danish opt-outs of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992) did not have this effect, but they were struck in happier times. Today the EU is under siege from populists looking to bring the edifice down, and joint projects like the passport-free Schengen zone are in grave danger.

Still, before all that British voters will have to be seduced by their prime minister’s diplomatic dance. So far, despite the EU showing Britain that it wants it inside the club, many Britons still seem distinctly unimpressed. Mr Cameron, hoisting his renegotiation prize triumphantly, does not want to follow Groucho’s example. But there is no guarantee that the electorate will agree.

This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the headline "Special privileges"

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