The chore of the Spanish succession

IN MOST places, when 3,030 people take an up-or-down vote, some sort of decision will probably emerge. But one should never underestimate the contentiousness of the Catalans. On December 27th an assembly of the far-left Popular Unity Candidacies (CUP) party deciding whether to back Catalonia’s acting president, Artur Mas, split the vote evenly—1,515 on each side. The deadlock means that, three months after elections, Mr Mas still cannot form a government to carry out his programme of moving steadily towards secession from Spain.

The Catalan impasse is part of a wider Spanish gridlock. Elections on December 20th splintered the political landscape. The duopoly of the conservative People’s Party (PP) of the prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, and the opposition Socialists (PSOE), who have traded turns in power for the past 33 years, has been upended. The insurgent left-wing Podemos and liberal Ciudadanos parties grabbed a third of the parliamentary seats between them, making a coalition or minority government a necessity. But Spain has little culture of coalition-building, and forming a government is a tall order. Fresh elections are also possible.

After losing over a third of the PP’s seats, Mr Rajoy’s attempts to form a new government seem destined to fail. Meanwhile Pedro Sánchez, the Socialist leader, led his party to a historic low with barely one in five votes. A “grand coalition” between them, possibly backed by Ciudadanos, would be the most stable option. But decades of enmity make that unlikely.

Instead Mr Sánchez fancies himself as the next prime minister. He would need to include the far-leftists of Podemos, which would be a triumph for southern Europe’s anti-austerity rebellion. But Podemos demands that Catalonia be granted a referendum on independence, which the Socialists refuse to accept. Mr Sánchez himself may soon face a leadership challenge, especially if party heavyweights, led by Susana Diez, the president of Andalusia, think he is selling them out. And even if Mr Sánchez and Podemos reach agreement, they do not have enough deputies; they would need the backing of either Ciudadanos or Catalan separatist parties.

Podemos and Ciudadanos would make strange bedfellows. One party rails against neoliberalism; the other backs liberal reforms. The leaders of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias, and of Ciudadanos, Albert Rivera, have good personal chemistry, and both see themselves as crusaders ridding Spanish politics of corruption. They agree on the need to depoliticise the judiciary and some regulatory agencies. Yet a government of the Socialists, Podemos and Ciudadanos would lack the votes to change the constitution, making it hard to resolve Spain’s biggest looming problem: Catalonia’s threat to secede.

Mr Mas and his Catalan Democratic Convergence party have been plodding towards secession for years. To secure the CUP’s backing, the once business-friendly leader is now dabbling in anti-austerity populism, promising to scrap a privatisation programme and commit his indebted region to an extra €270m ($296m) of social spending. His next steps towards independence are likely to clash with Spain’s constitution and may prod the new government to employ legal force against him. After four years without dialogue between Madrid and Barcelona, however, the two new governments may both be too weak to sort the problem out.

Spain’s economy grew by an estimated 3% in 2015, but the recovery remains fragile and inadequate. Unemployment is 21% and GDP is still lower than in 2007. The most recent report by Fitch, a ratings agency, stated the obvious: a long period of political uncertainty and reversals of reforms will damage business confidence. Spain could use a strong government. It looks likely to get a weak one.