Britannia waives

HAS once-staunch Britain become an unreliable ally, without its former appetite for military intervention in a good cause? David Cameron’s failure last week to persuade the House of Commons to support him in his call for military action against the regime of Bashar Assad has raised the question. Handled better, the vote might have gone the other way (see Bagehot). Yet a large part of Britain’s military, diplomatic and intelligence establishment also responded to the prospect of action against Mr Assad with a marked lack of enthusiasm. That may well prove more significant in the long term than the outcome of a single Commons vote.

At a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on August 28th, on the eve of Mr Cameron’s defeat in Parliament, there was unanimity among the politicians present, but a mood of weary resignation among some officials. Questions were raised that the prime minister appeared ill-prepared to answer. Had the possible consequences of military intervention been examined? What political outcome was being sought? And what if Mr Assad was not deterred from using chemical weapons by an initial attack?