Shia v Shia

By J.A. | BAGHDAD

Nuri al-Maliki’s chance of staying in power depends a lot on his fellow Shias

AS THE ballots are counted following the election on April 30th, Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister, is plainly determined to cobble together a broad enough coalition to stay in office. In the past he has consolidated power mainly at the expense of Sunni Arabs and Kurds. This time, after eight years as prime minister, he is likely to find that his strongest rivals for the top job come from within his own Shia group.

Many Shia voters in Iraq still look to the Marjaya, the establishment of senior religious scholars in the holy city of Najaf, to give them guidance when casting their ballots. Mr Maliki has brought the security and intelligence services under his control, has eroded the power of parliament and replaced military commanders with people loyal to him. But he has been less successful in creating unity among his fellow Shias—the overwhelming concern of the Marjaya.

During the campaign Ali al-Sistani, the 83-year-old grand ayatollah whose influence was pre-eminent in the early years after the American invasion, was silent, but other prominent clergymen in Najaf, including one of Mr Sistani’s closest confidants, called for change. “Every Friday [when they give sermons] they have been bashing the government for not delivering services, accusing them of corruption and for lacking principles and good governance,” says Bakhtiar Amin, a human-rights minister in Iraq’s first government after the American invasion of 2003. “The question is how much the Shias are following their spiritual leaders.”

Perhaps not as much as they used to. Early reports suggest Mr Maliki did well in Iraq’s mainly Shia southern provinces. Kirk Sowell of Inside Iraqi Politics, a twice-a-month newsletter, thinks Mr Maliki’s bloc could get 90-plus seats in a fragmented 328-seat parliament, which might be enough for him to keep his job “but not enough to close the deal easily.”

With that sort of score, Mr Maliki would have to persuade leading Shias who joined his coalition last time round, in 2010, to back him again. Some, however, may already be contemplating a similar Shia alliance—but under a different prime minister. For instance, Amar Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, may be considering an alliance with Mr Maliki’s party and that of Muqtada al-Sadr, a populist Shia firebrand, under a more palatable candidate for prime minister. During the election campaign, Mr Sadr ostensibly withdrew from politics, perhaps losing votes for his bloc and enabling Mr Maliki to make up ground.

Preliminary results are expected on May 15th, final ones on the 25th. “I think [Mr Maliki] benefited a lot from the fragmentation of the political spectrum,” says Anja Wehler-Schoeck, director of the Iraqi branch of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a German think-tank. She says that violence in Anbar, a Sunni province west of Baghdad, and elsewhere has heightened the sense of insecurity and perhaps made people keener to return to a strongman.

A final factor in the choice of prime minister may be Iran. Though the Americans have bemoaned Mr Maliki’s drift into Iran’s sphere of influence during the past few years, the ruling ayatollahs in Tehran may yet back someone even more friendly towards them. Mr Maliki is by no means home and dry.