The timing of a proposed truce locks in the regime’s military gains
PEACE in our time or a cynical diplomatic fudge? The best that can be said of the provisional agreement on a “cessation of hostilities” between at least some of the warring parties in Syria, hammered out (again) on February 22nd between John Kerry, America’s secretary of state, and Sergei Lavrov, his Russian opposite number, is that it appears to have slightly more solid foundations than a similar attempt earlier this month.
The agreement, which is due to come into force on February 27th, was endorsed by Vladimir Putin in a rare television address after he conferred by telephone with Barack Obama. As The Economist went to press, details of how it would be implemented were still being worked through. It looks likely that at least one of the requirements of the UN peace plan outlined by the UN Security Council late last year may be fulfilled: the lifting of sieges of rebel-held towns by government forces and the delivery of humanitarian aid to their starving populations. Some aid convoys began to roll from Damascus last week and more will follow. Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s president, has also promised to hold (meaningless) parliamentary elections on April 13th. Just about everything else remains unclear.
The Russians have given themselves and Mr Assad plenty of latitude in the way they wish to interpret the agreement. The Syrian regime refuses to describe it as a ceasefire, instead referring to a mere suspension of combat operations. In practice, it may not even amount to that.
Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, are officially designated as terrorist groups by both Moscow and Washington, and are thus explicitly excluded from the agreement. But JAN, intermingled with other rebel groups, is active on almost every front in the civil war, from Daraa in the far south of the country to Aleppo in the north. JAN is also the leading player in a rebel alliance that includes Ahrar al-Sham, a powerful Salafist outfit, and other less extreme groups. It controls most of Idlib province to the west of Aleppo. Having largely completed the encirclement of Aleppo, the regime’s next priority is to cut off and squeeze Idlib. Fabrice Balanche of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that if Russia continues air strikes against JAN, as the agreement entitles it to, it will be impossible for other groups fighting alongside it to respect the ceasefire.
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Before the assault on Idlib can begin in earnest, regime forces will need to lock in the gains of the Russian-backed assault of the past few weeks. The offensive has retaken swathes of rebel-held territory and cut off supply lines to Aleppo from Turkey with the help of Syrian-Kurdish YPG fighters, whom the Americans regard as their principal ally on the ground against IS. Such has been its speed that Mr Assad’s forces are in need of a breather. The timing of the ceasefire will thus be very convenient if it allows them to construct defensive lines against possible counter-attacks and foments division between those of their enemies abiding by the agreement and those ignoring it.
Mr Putin’s willingness to use hard power, and the West’s fear of confronting him, are allowing him to call the shots. A ceasefire on his terms, at a moment of his choosing, looks uncomfortably like a version of the Minsk 2 agreement struck a year ago to bring an end to the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Soon after, the town of Debaltseve fell to Russian-backed separatists after a devastating artillery assault. Since then there have been thousands of ceasefire violations by pro-Russian forces. Around 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
As things stand, the ceasefire meets all of Mr Putin’s diplomatic and military requirements. It confirms the survival of Mr Assad’s regime, potentially divides the rebels, puts Turkey on the back foot and panders to Western concerns by promising a more concerted effort against IS and the possibility of a political settlement that helps staunch the flow of refugees into Europe. From the perspective of Moscow and Damascus, what’s not to like?
This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under the headline "Russia calls the shots"
