Culture | Chinese politics

The people's pope

Two books explore the meaning of Xi Jinping

CEO, China: The Rise of Xi Jinping. By Kerry Brown. I.B. Tauris; 262 pages; $28 and £20.

Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping. By Willy Wo-Lap Lam. Routledge; 323 pages; $52.95 and £34.99.

THERE are few political questions to which the answer will have greater bearing on the lives of such a large number of people in the coming years as this: what sort of leader is Xi Jinping? Since Mr Xi emerged in 2010 as heir-apparent to the general-secretaryship of the Chinese Communist Party, and took on the job two years later, the question has exercised the minds of analysts even more than is normal when someone new takes over in China. As recently as the mid-2000s, Mr Xi was still little-known. His glamorous folk-singing wife was far more famous. The somewhat liberal leanings (by the party’s highly illiberal standards) of Mr Xi’s late father, a party grandee, provided one of the few available clues. It has proved highly misleading. Mr Xi has presided over the toughest crackdown on dissent in years.

One way of understanding China’s leader is suggested by the title of a new book: “CEO, China”. Yet as the author, Kerry Brown, a veteran British China-watcher, makes clear, Mr Xi is far more than merely the chief executive of a colossal economy. He compares Mr Xi’s role to that of the pope: “The general secretary, armed with doctrinal infallibility, like the pope, is a rule-giver, spiritual nurturer and voice of doctrinal purity and correctness,” he writes. Pope Francis, he notes, is battling to instil a renewed sense of mission into a Catholic church “that has lost touch with its spiritual roots, tarnished its legitimacy and become consumed by material power”. This, he says, is “eerily similar” to Mr Xi’s struggle to revamp his party.

It is somewhat easier, however, to understand how the pope wants to reform the church than it is to make out how Mr Xi intends to change the party, and his country. He says that market forces should play a decisive role, but does that mean he wants to topple state-owned enterprises from the commanding heights of the economy? His wish to purge the party of the egregious corruption that has permeated it at every level seems evident: his campaign against graft has been the most sustained and wide-ranging of any waged by a Chinese leader since the party seized power in 1949. But does he want to introduce checks and balances that would make it harder for corruption to take root? He stresses the importance of rule of law, but does he mean that courts should operate independently from the party, even in cases that involve challenges to the party’s rule? Many observers have lost hope that the answers to any of these questions might be affirmative.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, another experienced China-watcher based in Hong Kong, appears to have little doubt. His richly detailed book, “Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping”, describes Mr Xi as more “a disciple of Mao” than of Deng Xiaoping, the leader who began opening China to the outside world in the late 1970s. Mr Lam says Mr Xi has no interest in political or ideological liberalisation, having “learned the lessons” of the vicissitudes experienced by party liberals such as his father, who was imprisoned by Mao. Mr Xi has “totally ruled out” any option other than orthodox socialism, he writes.

But so great is the secrecy surrounding the highest echelons of power in China that it is impossible to know for sure. Mr Lam’s book came out in 2015 and covers less than two years of Mr Xi’s rule. Notably it does not extend as far as a meeting of the party’s Central Committee in October 2014, which emphasised the importance of the rule of law and the state constitution—an unusual focus of interest at such a gathering, and an intriguing one given the Chinese leader’s seeming disdain for both.

Mr Xi may in the end turn out to be more of a reformer than his frequent hardline rhetoric, his hammering of civil society and his tiptoeing round all-powerful state firms may suggest. A dwindling band of optimists pin their hopes on a crucial party congress late next year, at which Mr Xi will preside over sweeping leadership changes and set out the party’s goals for the remaining five years of his rule (assuming he accepts the norm of a ten-year limit on the general-secretaryship). Having placed more of his allies in key positions, Mr Xi may begin to do what he has said he wants to do: let market forces hold sway and put “power in a cage” of impartial law.

In his crisp and provocative account, Mr Brown suggests that analysts may be wrong to set much store by Mr Xi’s individual will. “The party is the power in China,” he writes. Mr Xi is “only powerful through it, operating within the limits it sets. On this basis, he is no Mao.” The party believes in the creation of a “strong, rich, stable” and respected country, says Mr Brown. The emotional power of this goal is what confers power upon Mr Xi (who describes it as the “Chinese dream”); unlike Mao, he cannot enforce discipline through terror or repression, the author argues. Mr Xi, he says, is a “servant” of the party’s ambition to restore China to the greatness it once enjoyed. It could “easily go badly” for him if sufficient numbers of his colleagues were to decide that he is taking the country in the wrong direction.

If Mr Brown is right, this may explain why Mr Xi, for all his seeming strength, appears to vacillate. Making China a respected global power will require the development of a more attractive political system. But Mr Xi is transfixed by a fear of unrest, and so clamps down ruthlessly on dissent. He acknowledges that making China rich and strong will require tough economic reforms. But these may trigger strikes and protests as state firms are closed or slimmed down, so he errs repeatedly on the side of caution. Failure to reform may eventually cause even greater instability, many analysts believe. But if Mr Xi agrees with them, he appears to think that on his watch, at least, repression will ensure that the party is obeyed. Given that the main mission entrusted to him by the party is an impossible one—keeping a one-party dictatorship in place for ever—he has few good options.

This article appeared in the Culture section of the print edition under the headline "The people's pope"

Erdogan’s revenge

From the July 23rd 2016 edition

Discover stories from this section and more in the list of contents

Explore the edition

Discover more

How to make money from the Bible

Donald Trump has entered a competitive and unusual market

Could your marriage survive a shipwreck?

“Maurice and Maralyn”, a new book about a couple stranded almost four months at sea, makes you wonder


What lies behind Beyoncé’s country turn?

The star singer has always been a canny interpreter of musical trends