3G’s purchases and their profit margins

By THE DATA TEAM

IT WAS the briefest of pursuits. On February 19th, Kraft Heinz, a food-retail company, halted its proposed acquisition of Unilever, just two days after it declared an interest in its consumer products rival. The marriage would have created the second-biggest consumer-goods group in the world. The idea was the brainchild of Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet’s investment company, and 3G Capital, a New York-based private equity firm. Together they control just under 50% of Kraft Heinz. This is the latest in a string of large takeover attempts by 3G. And it was hoping to do to Unilever what it has done elsewhere: cut costs and boost profits.

3G’s first love was beer. In the noughties it led a series of takeovers of breweries which culminated in InBev’s purchase of Anheuser-Busch in 2008. Two years later 3G developed a taste for food. It bought a stake in Burger King, a fast-food chain, and later merged it with Tim Hortons, a Canadian coffee-and-doughnut seller. Together the two companies formed Restaurant Brands International. In 2013, the investment group added Heinz, the baked-bean maker, to its books which was later married to Kraft Foods Group, to form Kraft Heinz.

With each purchase 3G has implemented a business plan based on cost-cutting. It forces managers to justify every cent of their budgets. After takeovers, job losses are common. When the private equity group led InBev’s takeover of Anheuser-Busch, it sliced the work force by 1,400. At Heinz it made over 7,000 workers redundant. All this austerity makes for more meaty profits. When it comes to profit margins 3G’s acquisitions consistently outperform their rivals.

Having been spurned by Unilever, 3G is apparently eyeing up new targets. Reports suggest it may have food manufacturers, such as Kellogg and Campbell Soup, in its sights. That news will depress employees but delight shareholders.