Middle East & Africa | Palestinian reconciliation

It might really happen

The Palestinians have a long way to go before the agreement they have just signed becomes reality. But it is worth the journey

|RAMALLAH

THE deal signed by the main Palestinian factions in Cairo on May 4th, after many years of bloody infighting, marks a possible turning-point in the long-drawn-out saga known, often despairingly, as the Middle East peace process. It also marks a shift in the foreign policy of Egypt, where a new intelligence chief brokered the deal. Indeed, it was the new Egyptian government's first foreign venture since the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak in February. The big question now is whether the deal will stick—and if so, whether it will eventually lead to new negotiations between a stronger and united Palestinian front and an Israeli government that has been shaken by the dramatic regional shift in power since Mr Mubarak's fall.

First reactions among Palestinians at large, both in the West Bank, the biggest bit of a future Palestinian state, and in the Gaza Strip, were deeply sceptical. As news of the agreement came out, cars in both territories were heard honking their horns. But the joyful noise was nothing to do with politics. It came from football fans who had been watching a televised match between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid.

No deal will soon end Palestine's division into two separate geographical components. Israel, which lies in between, will almost certainly continue to block passage between them. Moreover, many Palestinians have a sense of déjà vu. In February 2007, to similar fanfare, the same leaders signed a unity agreement in Mecca. The secular-minded Fatah, led by Mahmoud Abbas, which now runs the West Bank, agreed back then to settle its differences with the Islamists of Hamas, which runs Gaza. Yet three months after the Mecca deal, the rival militias were locked in a ferocious civil war which left scores dead and ended with Hamas in military control of Gaza. Four years on, it will take more than a piece of paper to bury their differences.

In many respects the Cairo accord resembles its Mecca predecessor. It is rich in principles, even as it shunts several of the thorniest issues, such as the proposed integration of rival security forces, into committees. Many of its details are ambiguous, leaving much scope for bickering when it is implemented. The agreement says nothing about local elections scheduled for July 9th, which Fatah is keen to hold because it thinks it will win them, and which Hamas wants to cancel, fearing it will lose. Hamas, on the other hand, wants immediately to reconvene the Palestinian Legislative Council, the mothballed parliament, in which it has a big majority, as a result of its victory in the general election of 2006. But Ibrahim Kharishi, self-styled chief clerk of parliament and a Fatah man, says the council cannot be reconvened for months, and only then if Hamas behaves itself in the run-up. God forbid, he says, in an office refurbished with red carpets, that the Islamists might once again use their majority in parliament to “steal power”.

In Gaza similar suspicions persist among the Hamas faithful. Its prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, who usually presents himself as a cuddly moderate, infuriated his Fatah compatriots by publicly proclaiming Osama bin Laden to be a martyr, may God have mercy on him. Some suggested he had deliberately made the remark in the hope that the deal with Fatah would be scuttled, since he will lose his job. As it was, the Israelis showed their distaste—and their capacity to hamper the agreement—by failing to hand over custom duties, on which the Palestinian Authority relies for a good chunk of its budget, at the end of the month. That threatened to mess up public-sector wages.

The Cairo agreement went down a lot better abroad. Unlike the national-unity government agreed upon in Mecca, which the EU rebuffed, this one will be comprised of technocrats. No member of Hamas will be included. Fatah and Hamas may even stick with Salam Fayyad, a former IMF man who is popular with Western donors, belongs to neither main faction, and currently runs the Palestinian Authority. To allay the fears of Europeans nervous of accusations that they are sponsoring terrorists, Hamas has also agreed to keep paying for its own public-sector appointees, such as policemen and teachers. In any case, Western governments have been learning in the past few months to do business with Islamists. And many of them are finding Israel's demand that Hamas should once again be ostracised annoyingly shrill (see article).

This time, there is a chance that the rival militias will not undermine the agreement as before. The security forces of Fatah and Hamas will each retain control of their fiefs in the West Bank and Gaza respectively. And this time Hamas's leaders in exile are keen to cosy up to the new Egyptian government, mindful that Syria's turmoil may force them out of Damascus. Hamas is also to be allowed into the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the national umbrella body, from which it had always been excluded. Pending elections for the PLO's representative body, the Palestinian National Council, the PLO will nominate a “higher committee for political affairs”, chaired by Mr Abbas, with senior Hamas men at his side. That will give Hamas a right of veto over big decisions, including negotiations with Israel. If an agreement were reached, it would be much stronger for having Hamas's backing.

Mr Abbas has something to show for ceding a measure of control. Hamas has accepted him as the Palestinian president. It says he may continue to co-ordinate with Israel over security in the West Bank, and promises to let Fatah resume politics in Gaza. In turn, he has agreed to let Hamas operate in the West Bank, while counting on Israel to curb its activities there. Above all, he has regained at least nominal authority over Gaza. When he goes to the UN General Assembly in September to present his case for the recognition of a Palestinian state, he can now fend off barbs that he speaks for only half of Palestine.

Correction to this article

This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under the headline "It might really happen"

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