The hangover

ALMOST half a decade after the onset of the rich world's credit bust, depressing evidence of its after-effects is visible in everything from feeble output figures to swollen jobless rolls. But for a truly grim picture, read a new report on deleveraging by the McKinsey Global Institute. It points out that in many rich countries the process of debt reduction hasn't even started. America has begun to pare its debt burden, although the drop is small compared with the build-up in 2000-08 (see chart). But many European countries are more, not less, in hock than they were in 2008. There the hangover could last another decade or more.

These transatlantic differences stem from the trajectory of private debt. Government borrowing soared everywhere after 2008 as government deficits ballooned. But in America the swelling of the public balance-sheet has mirrored a shrinking of private ones. Every category of private debt—financial, corporate and household—has fallen as a share of GDP since 2008. The financial sector's debt is now at its 2000 level. Corporate indebtedness, never very high, has shrunk. So, more importantly, has household debt. America's ratio of household debt to income is down by 15 percentage points from its peak in 2008, after rising by over 30 percentage points in the eight preceding years. McKinsey reckons America's households are between a third and halfway through their debt-reduction process. They think the household-debt hangover could end by mid-2013.

In Europe private debt has fallen much less and in some cases even risen. In Britain the financial sector's debts have grown since 2008. In Spain corporate debt, far higher as a share of GDP than in most rich countries, has barely budged. But the biggest difference is among households. Even countries which saw the biggest surges in household debt during the bubble era, such as Britain and Spain, have scarcely seen a dent since 2008. McKinsey's analysts reckon it will take British households up to a decade to work off their debt burdens.

It's not that American households have been more frugal or disciplined. Household debt has fallen largely thanks to defaults, particularly on mortgages. America had a bigger housing bust; in some states non-recourse lending rules make default easier (people can walk away from home loans without fear of losing other assets). Some two-thirds of America's $600 billion decline in household debt is due to defaults. With another $250 billion of mortgages in the process of foreclosure, further reduction is likely.

Compare world debt levels over time with our updated interactive debt guide

Europe's post-bubble economies, in contrast, have seen smaller drops in house prices, lower mortgage costs thanks to variable interest-rate mortgages, and gentler treatment from banks. The Bank of England suggests that around 12% of British mortgages receive some kind of forbearance. Fewer people are turfed out of their homes, but the millstone of debt weighs for longer.

America's private-sector debt reduction has also taken place against the backdrop of loose fiscal policy. Although state and local governments have been cutting back, the federal government has (at least until now) put off most fiscal tightening. In Europe, however, the sovereign-debt crisis means governments have been forced, or chosen, to undertake swingeing budget cuts long before the private sector's deleveraging is done.

Note the Nordics

That stands in stark contrast to most successful bouts of debt reduction. The McKinsey report pores over two episodes that it considers most relevant for today: the experiences of Sweden and Finland following their banking busts in the early 1990s. Debt reduction took place in two stages. In stage one, the private sector reduces its debts; the economy is weak and public debt soars. In stage two, growth recovers and the longer-term process of reducing government debt begins. In both these cases growth was buoyed by booming exports, a boon that seems unlikely this time. But it is telling that Sweden did not begin its budget-cutting until the economy had recovered; and that when Finland tried an early bout of austerity, this worsened its recession.

The McKinsey analysts carefully avoid suggesting this means Europe's austerity is misguided. Circumstances today are different, they argue: European governments began with higher debt and deficits, leaving them with less room for manoeuvre. But the message is clear: America is closer to Sweden's successful template than Europe is. Debt reduction is very difficult without economic growth, and the scale of Europe's austerity makes it hard to see where that growth will come from.

That's all the more true because Europe's governments have been remarkably timid, compared with the Nordics, in exploiting another avenue to growth—structural reform. The report underscores just how dramatically Sweden and Finland overhauled their economies in the wake of their debt crises. Banks were nationalised and restructured; whole sectors, such as retailing, were deregulated. Thanks to a slew of efficiency-enhancing reforms, productivity soared and investment boomed.

Nothing so bold has been attempted this time. America has not managed much in the way of growth-enhancing structural reforms and has a long to-do list, from improving worker training to reining in health-care costs. But it is in Europe where the potential gains from structural reforms are greatest and where the policy focus has nonetheless been overwhelmingly on austerity.

That may change. With much of the euro zone in recession, structural reforms are getting higher billing. Spain's new government began with an extra dollop of austerity; it now wants to accelerate the freeing of its rigid labour rules. Italy's prime minister, Mario Monti, first raised taxes and cut spending; now he is about to take on the unions. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, is saying that Europe's leaders need to focus on growth. But a shift in the policy mix will not stop many European countries' debt burdens from spiralling yet higher. Depressing, indeed.