Hong Kong’s reputation is being damaged

This is a by-invitation commentary in a series on “Hong Kong’s Future,” part of The Economist’s Open Future initiative, which aims to foster a global conversation across the ideological spectrum on vital issues. You can comment here or on Facebook and Twitter. More articles can be found at Economist.com/openfuture

MORE THAN 70 days after the first mass protest against the government’s “extradition” bill on June 9th, Hong Kong continues to be gripped by large-scale demonstrations and threats of fresh mobilisations to paralyse the airport and mass-transit railways. Although the protest on August 18th, which organisers claim was attended by 1.7m people, concluded peacefully, no end to the prolonged conflict is in sight.

Earlier this month, tensions escalated following pronouncements by senior officials at a meeting in Shenzhen, just across the border in mainland China, that the Chinese government would not sit on its hands if the violence worsened and the situation got out of control. Prior to that, the national emblem at China’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong had been defaced with black paint by demonstrators. On two separate occasions in the following days, the national flag was pulled off a harbour-side flagpole and thrown into the water.

Many feared that China would not allow such deliberate acts of provocation go unpunished. Footage of paramilitary police in Shenzhen training for anti-riot deployment heightened anxiety that direct intervention by China’s armed forces would be inevitable.

Under article 14 of the Basic Law, the special administrative region’s mini-constitution, the local government may, when necessary, ask for assistance from the People’s Liberation Army’s garrison in Hong Kong in the maintenance of public order and disaster relief. Or alternatively, under article 18, if the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress decides that Hong Kong is in a state of emergency by reason of turmoil “which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control of the government of the Region”, it may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in Hong Kong. Either option would permit the direct deployment of China’s armed forces in Hong Kong.

Yet even though Hong Kong’s police have been severely stretched, and deliberate acts of humiliation of national dignity had been staged by the protesters, as if to goad the mainland into action, stern warnings by officials in Beijing are more likely to be intended as a shot across the bow than a prelude to direct intervention.

Deliberate acts of humiliation of national dignity had been staged by the protesters, as if to forcibly goad the mainland into action.

That is because leaders in Beijing are all too keenly aware that, even though any direct intervention would be legally justifiable under the terms of the Basic Law, and in practice necessary for the purpose of stopping violence and restoring order, any such intervention would be bound to be negatively portrayed by the international community as an “act of suppression of Hong Kong’s freedoms”.

The reputational damage to China as a responsible actor in the international community, and as the originator of the innovative concept of “One Country, Two Systems”, would be too costly for a country already embroiled in a geopolitical struggle with the world’s most powerful democracy.

For three decades, the events of Tiananmen Square on June 4th—with the image of one man trying to stop a tank, and accusations of bloody suppression of students—have hung around the leadership like the albatross around the ancient mariner’s neck. There is a sense, among all those with a deep awareness of history, that China’s enemies have not forgotten, and are indeed watching, if not covertly planning, for such events to be repeated.

Whether during the “Occupy Central” movement in the autumn of 2014, or in the current confrontation, any attentive observer would have noticed rhetoric on the part of the organisers strongly redolent of the language of the June 4th victims. Calls by students for dialogue with the top leader in the government’s civic square, appeals by the mothers of protesters for the authorities not to “hurt their children”, tweets claiming “Oh my God, the Police are shooting at children!”, and so on, all appear to be attempts to portray the events in Hong Kong as violent suppression by an intransigent government deaf to the demands of the people.

Yet the way the Hong Kong police have responded to the provocations stands in marked contrast to how their forebears dealt with past violent protests, let alone the way mainland Chinese authorities dealt with the protests in Beijing in 1989.

In 1966 in the district of Kowloon on the north side of Hong Kong harbour, unrest was sparked by a proposed rise in ferry fares but reflected simmering public anger. It lasted only four days, yet 93 rounds of live ammunition, were fired resulting in one killed and three injured from gunshot wounds; 1,200 canisters of tear gas were fired; some 1,465 protesters were arrested and more than 300 were sentenced to prison. The British-led joint police-military operations, supplemented by auxiliary defence units, quashed the riots in a matter of days, using overwhelming force.

For more than three decades, the events of Tiananmen … have hung round the leadership like the albatross around the ancient mariner’s neck.

No such option is available to the Hong Kong government. By reason of being a special administrative region of China, it has to be mindful of the frequent allegations of undue interference directed at China. Its police have to be extremely careful in their use of force. For that reason, the police force has been criticised for alternating between abandoning its positions when it should have intervened, and for using excessive force when such force was deemed unnecessary by the public.

Other than relying on the police, the government scored a significant victory recently in restoring order at its international airport by obtaining a court injunction to prohibit unlawful and willful “obstructing or interfering with the proper use of the Hong Kong International Airport”. Perhaps out of awareness on the part of the protesters that they had gone too far in paralysing the airport, and possibly out of underlying respect for the authority of the court, the protesters eventually dispersed peacefully, a welcome sign that the rule of law still commands substantial authority in Hong Kong.

I have no crystal ball to predict when the present conflict will be brought to a close. LIHKG, the online platform for mobilising this supposedly faceless and leaderless movement, remains as active as ever in organising. Many sensitive dates, such as the fifth anniversary of the onset of the “Occupy Central” demonstrations on September 26th, as well as China’s National Day on October 1st, loom as potent dates for renewed mass mobilisations.

The riots which convulsed Hong Kong in 1967, which were inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China, took eight months to quieten down. If “external forces” are indeed involved in the present conflict as in 1967, it may take a few more months before the present turmoil is brought to a close.

Hong Kong will emerge a different city from its former self

As and when the present turmoil finally comes to an end, Hong Kong will emerge a different city from its former self—the authority of its government severely battered, law and order and the city’s reputation for safety badly damaged. The police’s relationship with the people, especially young people, will take years to repair.

As for the city’s future, it has much less cause for concern about direct, forceful intervention from the mainland, than from reports, just released, that the Party leadership and the State Council want to build neighbouring Shenzhen into a “pilot demonstration area of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” to better implement the strategy to develop the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area, and to strengthen the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems”.

Are plans being made to groom Shenzhen as the new Hong Kong? In view of Hong Kong’s declining economic importance to China and its tendency to become a source of conflict, perhaps Hong Kong should be more worried about abandonment by China than intervention.

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Regina Ip is a member of the Executive Council and Legislative Council of Hong Kong. She was the Secretary for Security from 1998 to 2003.

Other articles in the “Hong Kong’s Future” series include commentaries by:
Christine Loh
Fernando Cheung