Why do countries with more democracy want less of it?

ONE OF THE assumptions often made about democracies is that, like wine, they get more palatable with age. Citizens of democratic societies grow up learning about the benefits of political freedoms and civil liberties. As adults, they reap the rewards of representative government. The more time a country spends as a democracy, the argument goes, the more the public will support it.

But new research in the American Political Science Review suggests this presumption may be wrong. Using data on democratic quality as well as public opinion in 135 countries, Christopher Claassen of the University of Glasgow finds that after countries strengthen certain democratic institutions—in particular those intended to protect individual rights and check the power of executives—public support for democracy falls. Conversely, when democracy is weakened, support for it tends to increase. Mr Claassen measured levels of democracy using indices that tracked elements such as the cleanliness of elections, adult enfranchisement and the protection of individual and minority rights. He defined “democratic mood” as national-level support for democratic versus non-democratic regimes and used statistical models to adjust for differences in national surveys.

This phenomenon can be seen most clearly in autocracies and fledgling democracies. After Egypt began experimenting with representative democracy in 2012, following decades of authoritarian rule and a popular revolution sparked by the Arab Spring, public support for democracy fell. A similar story has played out elsewhere. Croatia, Kenya and Peru, for example, all witnessed declines in support for democracy following the introduction of greater political freedoms and liberties (see chart).

The inverse also holds. After Hugo Chávez began dismantling Venezuela’s democratic institutions following his election in 1998, enthusiasm for democracy spiked. It would eventually reach levels found in Scandinavia, where support for democracy is higher than it is in most regions. “It’s such a clear effect of people reacting to Chávez undermining democracy,” says Mr Claassen.

This relationship emerges in countries with long-established democracies, too. As America’s democracy strengthened in the early 2000s, public support dipped. In the past few years, as measures of liberal democracy in America have declined slightly, support has edged back up. Increases in electoral representation of and participation by women and minorities have tended to increase America’s rankings in international democracy tables over the years. Recent attacks on judicial independence and growing polarisation have lowered its placement.

Why are people so fickle about something so fundamental? Mr Claassen reckons that the introduction of certain liberal aspects of democracy—such as the protection of individual rights and checks on executive power—may dampen support for it. These features may be more difficult for the public to accept than principles such as majority rule (which even some authoritarian regimes embrace). The study is a reminder that support for democracy cannot be taken for granted. Although it may be better than any alternative form of government that has been tried from time to time, it is still far from perfect.