Hamas’s attack was an Israeli intelligence failure on multiple fronts

THE VICIOUS success of Hamas’s attack on Israel, without their plans being unveiled, is matched by the astounding failure of Israeli intelligence at every level. The assault by land, sea and air on October 7th left at least 800 dead in Israel, and must have required months of planning. Officials are in shock that such a significant military buildup by the Islamist movement that controls Gaza escaped their notice. That will surely be the subject of multiple investigations once the fighting in Gaza is over. But it is already clear that the failures came in two forms: one of intelligence-collecting and the other of assessing and interpreting that intelligence.

First, Israel was let down by its extensive array of electronic sensors, surveillance systems and old-fashioned human intelligence in the form of agents on the ground. These are all the responsibility of the army’s intelligence branch and Shin Bet, the domestic security service which is tasked with covering Gaza and the West Bank.